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O ne day in the summer of 2004, a shift of activists from CheckpointWatch (CPW) brought to the checkpoint some cookies that one of
them had baked earlier that morning. Checkpoint Watch is an all-
women Israeli organization that opposes the Israeli checkpoints in the
occupied Palestinian territories and the Israeli 1967 occupation more
broadly. Its members conduct routine tours to monitor changes in the
deployment of checkpoints and stand in regular shifts at the larger,
manned checkpoints in the West Bank. As they spend several hours
weekly at specific checkpoints, some activists develop acquaintances with
both the soldiers who operate them and the Palestinians who regularly
pass through them. Many also stop for coffee at the local Palestinian
“shacks,” conduct weekly political debates with soldiers, and try to pass
the time in conversation. Therefore, it may have seemed trivial, for the
activists, to share homemade cookies with the people they encounter
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weekly. This is precisely what happened on that morning in 2004: a trivial
event that probably happenedmany times before andmany times afterwards.
Encouraged by positive reactions to the baked goods, this particular shift
of women started bringing cookies to the checkpoint regularly. For various
reasons (such as the spatial organization of the checkpoints, or the shared
language and background) the soldiers became the main beneficiaries of
this practice and, therefore, when it became known to other members of
the organization, an internal debate was ignited among CPW activists:
How could these women do such a thing? How will the Palestinians
perceive us if we start giving treats to their oppressors? How can an
oppositional organization tolerate its representatives acting like
“mommies”? Some activists, however, voiced a different set of concerns:
What if the cookies sweeten the way to the soldiers’ hearts and eventually
benefit the Palestinians? Happy soldiers tend to let people pass the
checkpoint more easily; they tend to be less violent and more
cooperative when the activists point to a specific problem. A fierce e-mail
correspondence among CPW’s members and intense discussions at the
monthly meetings eventually ended with a decision: no more cookies at
the checkpoint; no more overt maternal behavior. Yet, the fact that this
debate had to be conducted, the fact that it was perceived as so
significant, and the fact that every once in a while it surfaces again,
reveal the significance of this (and similar) occurrence.
The story of the cookies is just one example of a wider claim, according
to which activists of CPW often assume traditional gender roles — most
often the maternal role — that enable them to increase the efficacy of
their presence at the checkpoints.1 I analyze this mobilization of gender
to show that the effectiveness of the maternal forms of intervention at the
local level carry undesired effects at the structural level. These
appropriations of gender roles facilitate a misreading of the watchers’
action, which depoliticizes their critique and eventually incorporates it
to justify the perpetuation — even entrenchment — of the
checkpoints. I then move to consider a second case of Israeli women’s
activism: the case of Tali Fahima, a young Israeli woman who used her
privileged body (privileged by the virtue of being both Jewish and
female) as a human shield to protect a leader of a Palestinian military
group. My query, however, remains similar: how does assuming
particular gendered positions, or ascribing them to a political action,
1. On the receptivity of the Israeli public to a political opposition made from a maternal stance, see
Neuman (2004) and Sharoni (1997).
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serve to marginalize or twist a political massage? Fahima was assumed to be
this leader’s lover, and this framing of her action, I argue, served to
reinscribe national and racial anxieties in Israel.
Ultimately, by suggesting different readings of both cases, I show how the
moment of co-optation — into both gender and national orders — opens
new possibilities of resistance, or at least sets in motion new processes of
resignification. The “full meaning” of any political story “can reveal itself
only when it has ended,” argued Arendt (1998, 192). But when does a
political story end? And who is its legitimate teller? If these questions
have no answers — and I propose that they rarely have — then the “full
meaning” can never be determined, and I have no pretence of
determining it here. My point is to raise different possible stories, which
sometimes demand that we allow conflicting interpretations (even
“judgments”) to coexist.
BACKGROUND
In themidst of “peace negotiations,” “peace processes,” and “talks” of many
kinds, Israel developed a system that enables it to maintain its control over
the occupied Palestinian territories with minimal physical (military)
presence and direct violence. At stake is Israel’s ability to present (and
perceive) itself as being peace seeking without relinquishing the benefits
of controlling the land and its resources. Halper (2000) has termed this
system “the matrix of control”:
It is an interlocking series of mechanisms, only a few of which require physical
occupation of territory, that allow Israel to control every aspect of Palestinian
life in the Occupied Territories. The matrix works like the Japanese game of
Go. Instead of defeating your opponent as in chess, in Go you win by
immobilizing your opponent, by gaining control of key points of a matrix so
that every time s/he moves s/he encounters an obstacle of some kind.
Writing in 2000, Halper could have seen only the seeds of the dense grid of
checkpoints that would become the predominant component within this
matrix. Together with a convoluted and opaque system of permits, two
separate systems of roads, the separation barrier, and hundreds of dirt
mounds, rock piles, fences, and gates, the manned checkpoints strictly
regulate Palestinian movement and with it Palestinian lives.
As a report by B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization, states:
“Since the early 1990s, Israel has gradually and steadily expanded and
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refined its movement restrictions policy,” and by 2001 these restrictions
became “unprecedented”; “Palestinian freedom of movement has turned
from a fundamental human right to a privilege that Israel grants or
withholds as it deems fit” (B’Tselem 2007, 7–8). In the summer of 2010,
there were 64 manned checkpoints (47 of them in the midst of the
Palestinian territories — surrounding the big cities and dissecting roads;
the rest were closer to the Green Line, marking an “entry point” to Israel)
and 540 physical obstacles in the West Bank (OCHA 2010). The density
and dispersal of the checkpoints mean that they prevent — or at least
severely hinder — what many of us see as mundane, daily life: going to
work, attending a relative’s wedding, shopping at the market, or going
to school. All are simple routines for most people, but they are denied to
most Palestinians or are “purchased” with the cost of valuable time; time
that is robbed, as Hass (2005) put it, and “cannot ever be returned”:
The loss of time, which Israel is stealing every day from 3.5 million people,
is evident everywhere: in the damage it causes to their ability to earn a
living; in their economic, family and cultural activity; in the leisure
hours, in studies and in creativity; and in the shrinking of the space in
which every individual lives and therefore the narrowing of their horizon
and their expectations.
In other words, “scarcity of time disables space” (Handel 2009). It narrows
the land and disables the possibility of forming a political community.
What thus emerges is a mode of controlling the space and the
population that inhabits it by controlling the temporality and continuity
of the movement within it.2
TREACHEROUS PLAYGROUNDS: CPW
In 2001, as the checkpoints expanded, a small group of Israeli women
established CPW to oppose the checkpoints as one of the occupation’s
2. Control over movement enables Israel to maintain two of the key distinctions underlying the
occupation. The distinction between space and population (Gordon 2008) is maintained when the
fragmentation of space renders vast areas effectively inaccessible to the majority of a (fragmented)
Palestinian population. As Handel shows, the construction of different moving bodies — of Jewish
settlers and soldiers on the one hand, and of Palestinians on the other — and the radical
differentiations between the regulations to which the movements of these bodies are subjected
enforce the separation between the two major populations under Israeli rule: citizens and
noncitizens (Azoulay and Ophir 2008). For more on the regime of movement in the occupied
Palestinian territories, see Bishara (2006) and Weizman (2007).
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primary apparatuses.3 Whereas the main practice of the organization is
observation and documentation, sometimes activists cannot maintain this
detached position. Some experience an urge to intervene in some form to
somehow – marginally as it may be – reduce the hardship inflicted upon
Palestinians by and at the checkpoints. Indeed, the social and spatial layouts
of the checkpoints facilitate forms of intervention. At many checkpoints,
activists often stand adjacent to the soldiers, they share language and
nationality, and they often belong to the economic and ethnic elite in
Israel, which grants them some informal authority. Thus, different practices
of intervention are common within the organization. Sometimes these
interventions take a discrete form (such as standing next to a Palestinian to
protect her from violent eruptions by soldiers); in other cases, the
organization is involved in more systemic negotiations with the army (such
as appeals to regional commanders in order to change checkpoint
regulations).
Such interventions are not part of the agreed ideology or forms of operation
of the organization, and in recent years, the organization has become
increasingly critical of them. At times, however, such forms of intervention
— in the singular, concrete, and immediate benefit they may hold —
seem the most urgent. This sense of urgency produces an almost-
impossible-to-resist desire to be effective. This, in turn, prompts conformist
gender practices aimed at producing a traditional voice to which the
soldier can relate. The performance of such familiar forms of relationships
often makes the soldiers more susceptible to the activists’ requests —
requests to release people who have been detained as a form of
punishment, to allow an ill person hospital access even if he or she does
not have the necessary permits, or to open another line when the lines are
getting long and the sun is setting. One of these familiar positions is the
maternal, which is relatively available to most activists also because most
soldiers are between the ages of 18 and 21, and most activists are at least in
their 50s. Many are indeed mothers and grandmothers of soldiers.
The all-female makeup of CPW produces ambivalent, and at times
contradictory, rationales. Since I have elaborated on this subject
elsewhere (Kotef and Amir 2007), it is sufficient to argue that it translates
neither into an articulated feminist politics of the organization nor into
an explicit or coherent form of maternal politics. “Maternalism,” rather,
3. I joined the organization in 2004 and was an active member for two years until I left Israel. This
article is based on my experience during these years and supported by further unsystematic
engagements I had with the organization during my visits to Israel and online.
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appears on isolated occasions and amounts to sporadic employment of
maternal practices by individual activists. At the checkpoints, these
practices may include speaking to soldiers with a particular intonation,
expressing concern to the soldiers themselves, “educating” them,
demanding that they “behave better,” or bringing them cookies.
We can argue, then, that we have here a strategic appropriation of the
maternal position that should be differentiated from two main positions:
first, from the position of women’s peace organizations that see in their
members’ social roles as mothers an essential aspect of their all-female
makeup and that base their antiwar politics on maternal language and
practices (Ruddick 1995);4 and second, from the position of women’s
peace organizations that adopt gender essentialism as an overall strategy
and rely on essentialist assumptions to position themselves in a specific
(non) political niche — mostly humanitarian — that enables them to
operate (Helms 2007; Neuman 2004). Unlike these two options, in the
case of CPW the motherly stance is not integral to the operation of the
organization. It does not serve as the organization’s source of legitimacy
and does not form the grounds on which the activists declare their
activities. Rather, it is mobilized locally and ad hoc as a tool assisting the
activists to act when they can no longer simply watch.
Sparks’s (1997) notion of “strategic straightness” may be helpful in further
explaining such mobilizations of gender. In the particular context of their
political intervention, CPW activists may be seen as situated on the verge of
what Sparks terms dissident citizenship: “the practices of marginalized
citizens, who publicly contest prevailing arrangements of power by
means of oppositional democratic practices that augment or replace
institutionalized channels of democratic opposition when those channels
are inadequate or unavailable” (Sparks 1997, 75). As upper- to middle-class
Ashkenazi (Jews of European heritage), CPW activists are by no means
“marginalized citizens.” Yet since the view that the checkpoints are
necessary to prevent the massacre of Israelis is so prevalent in Israel today,
their call to dismantle the checkpoints renders their political voice
precarious; they are often accused of being traitors or dismissed as
madwomen. When such precariousness is at play, argues Sparks,
organizations may adopt “strategic straightness:” an alignment to hetero-
normative positions in order to perform from a position of respectability and
4. In Israel, the most dominant among such organizations was Four Mothers, which operated against
the occupation of Lebanon. Tronto’s (2008) work on peacekeeping intervention suggests that such a
stance is — or should be — inherent to the praxis of peace promotion and peacekeeping.
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belonging to a social center. Such performances create a base of legitimacy
that supports controversial political claims (Sparks 2009). Adopting a
maternal stance may be understood precisely within this framework.5
It seems that behind this explanation lies the assumption that the
maternal stance functions here not (only) as part of one’s identity but
also as something of a “strategy”: playing on gender and gender
stereotypes not in order to “be” a person gendered in a particular way
but, rather, in order to charge one’s actions with more potency. Yet
recent feminist and queer scholarship has called into question this
differentiation between “being” and “doing.” If gender is produced
through performing gender stances and gendered practices, as Butler
(1999) has argued, then one is always on the verge of becoming what
one mobilizes. Moreover, one can successfully mobilize only what is
already available as plausible within the array of gender identities. This
point is not new, but here it has further stakes: It means that a “strategy”
can never be fully controlled by the activist. The possibility of adopting it
ad hoc, of using it one moment for one purpose and then abandoning it,
is not always an option. A strategy can become part of one’s “identity” —
it can be called upon, summoned, taken to be permanent, and become
the lens through which one’s actions are interpreted.
This claim can be seen as introducing a Butlerian inversion into Arendt’s
theory of action by examining the manners by which political actions
appear on a discursive public surface.6 While what follows is, to some
extent, a concrete manifestation of Arendt’s argument regarding the
“inherent unpredictability” of political actions, it also shows that her
claim that the essence of the actor emerges through the action does not
carry the promise of authenticity and uniqueness she attaches to it.
Rather, the emerging “essence” — that “lasting state of being which is
neither subject to change nor capable of effecting change” (Arendt,
1998) — is in this case precisely the object of many poststructuralist
feminist critiques. It is an “identity” that can never achieve its pretence
of stability nor the presumed authenticity it seemingly marks. It is but an
assemblage of “whatnesses” — of possible social positions one can
occupy (or not) in different ways. The “who” that emerges here is not a
manifestation of the actors’ uniqueness, but a cliche´ to which they “fold
5. Swerdlow (1993) describes similar practices of American peace activists who deployed maternal
language to gain credibility and perform loyalty (if not patriotism) as they faced charges of subversion
during the Cold War.
6. See Honig (1995) for a more systematic account of the theoretical grounds that enable one to
examine Arendt’s political theory through the lens of Butler’s notion of performativity.
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over” by an action they may have imagined as detachable from their
identity. (To put it more concretely: CPW activists do not necessarily
perceive themselves as mothers in this context and may not be mothers
at all).
Consider a section from a CPW report that manifests this collapse:
At the beginning she cried with no voice; only big tears ran down her scared
face; scared as any face of any child who suddenly lost her mom. We
approached her: “Where is your mother? Are you lost”? . . . We
approached the soldier; perhaps he can call the mother through the
loudspeaker system. This [only] made him laugh. . . . The crying of the
girl got louder and louder. I tried to caress her when my cell phone rang.
My older son called to tell me that my 11-year-old daughter missed her
drama class again because I forgot to call and remind him to take her to
the community center. “Why are the Palestinians more important to you
than your own children?” he rebuked me. I heard my daughter crying at
the other end of the line as I suddenly saw the mother. . . . The girl ran to
her mother, held strongly to her brother’s hand and they all left the
checkpoint.7
The activist now becomes a mother, and her motherhood becomes the
pivot around which everything that happens at the checkpoint is
organized, the lens through which suffering and wrongdoing, as well as
the activist’s own position, are perceived and reported. But it is quite
unclear what this “becoming” means in this context. What, for example,
do such performances of motherhood at the front line do to the meaning
of motherhood itself? To the identity of the women of CPW — as both
activists and mothers? To the addressees of their maternal concerns (and
who are these addressees? — soldiers? Palestinians? both? — and what
would this “both” produce at the level of national and racial identities?)?
I touch upon some of these questions in the last section of this paper, but
I think that there is an altogether different set of questions that should be
prioritized in this case. The effects of playing with gender identities here
may have a bearing not only on the identity of the actors but also on the
materiality of the occupation itself.
In the summer of 2007, at the Beit Furick checkpoint, a shift of watchers
met an officer they had previously encountered. They wrote in their report:
The officer asks that we wait. In a few minutes he will be available and he
wants to tell us something that will interest us for sure. We waited and he
told us that he is working on improving the way children are treated at the
7. CPW internal report, October 4, 2006 (my translation).
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checkpoint. He wants to have a separate line for children, with a more
considerate approach. In addition, he intends to build a small playground
at the checkpoint, in which they could wait until their parents will get
through the adult lines.8
You may be able to hear in these words the pride the officer took in telling
the activists about his new plan, as if he had responded to their demand —
a demand that was never made but perhaps surfaced, despite the activists, as
an outcome of their collapse into motherhood. A playground, after all,
speaks precisely to the concerns of “the mother.”
A maternal presence at the checkpoints can prompt a (mis)reading of
CPW’s critique as rationalized mainly by care and concern for
humanitarian aspects. This critique is thereby depoliticized and
reconfigured as a critique that can be addressed by improving the
facilities at the checkpoints instead of dismantling them: by erecting
roofs, constructing toilet facilities, bringing water tanks, manufacturing
“humanitarian gates” for people in wheelchairs, or even building
playgrounds. The playground — which as of yet has not been built —
is thus just one instance of a broader process in which the checkpoints
have evolved into elaborate monstrosities that masquerade as “humane”
facilities.9 At a site whose mere existence is a violation of human rights
and human dignity, a playground offers the pretense of displaying a
humane approach, as if parents would be relieved if their children
played under the drawn weapons of Israeli soldiers while they are
squeezed together in the long lines; as if a slide or a swing would make
people blind to the wrongs of the checkpoints.
At stake in this expansion of the checkpoints is more than grabbing
Palestinian land to build a grotesque structure, more than a redundant
facility of the occupying forces in the midst of an occupied land. Since
many checkpoints have also attained the fac¸ade of normal border
crossings, they conceal not merely concrete violence but also
occupation. At stake, therefore, is the possibility of justifying and
maintaining a more pervasive occupation simultaneously with an
ongoing “peace process.” This development is far from being the
contribution of CPW alone. Moreover, within the operation of the
organization, it may be ascribed to the wider instinctive interventions
aimed at resolving local problems and not to their “maternal moments.”
Without understanding the concrete materialization of this instinct
8. Checkpoint Watch Report, May 4, 2007 (my translation).
9. While this specific playground was never built, another was built in Barta’a (Reihan) checkpoint.
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within maternal positions, however, we cannot fully understand the
smooth slide by which a political critique of the Israeli occupation is
framed as a humanitarian critique that is eventually essential to the
occupation’s maintenance.10
OVER THE EDGE OF POLITICS: TALI FAHIMA
In August 2003, Tali Fahima, a young Jewish Israeli whowas never part of a
formal political organization, traveled for the first time to the Palestinian
city of Jenin in order to meet with Zacharia Zubeidi. Zubeidi was the
head of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a Palestinian military group that
planned and executed several suicide attacks in Israel and, until recently,
was known for its persistent refusal of any form of cease-fire with Israel.
Although Israelis are prohibited from entering Palestinian cities, Fahima
visited Jenin several times and was arrested and released several times as
she crossed the checkpoints surrounding this city. After Zubeidi escaped
a targeted assassination attempt, Fahima publicly declared that she
would serve as his human shield and moved to his house to live with
him and his family, arousing a turbulent reaction in Israel. This time, on
her way back from Jenin, she was arrested, jailed, and accused of treason
and assisting an enemy in a time of war.11
Yet, although these were the formal charges, they concealed another
allegation that was perceived to be at least as severe. Despite her denials,
Fahima was “accused” of being Zubeidi’s lover, and the alleged affair
between the two was the focus of almost all media coverage of her story.
The formal charges of “betrayal” of the homeland thus rested on another
assumed betrayal, a sexual betrayal of the only legitimate sexual partner:
Jewish, Israeli, man. And the fact that Fahima was often described at the
same time as having a “lesbian look” suggests that the precise practice by
which she transgressed this prescribed sexual norm was not important.
10. On this symbiosis, see Azoulay and Ophir 2004; Kotef and Amir 2007; Weizman 2007.
11. The charges were very soon radically reduced, eventually amounting to the claim that Fahima had
translated a military map for Zubeidi. Fahima was found guilty (even though Zubeidi speaks fluent
Hebrew and it is doubtful that he needed Fahima’s translation services) and sent to prison. She was
released after more than two years in jail. The link between passing information to a rival ethnic/
national group and engaging in (forbidden) sexual ties with members of this group was not invented
in Israel. Maunaguru cites a letter published in the LTTE (The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam)
official newspaper Eelanatham in 1991. The letter states that young Tamil women traveling to
Colombo “become friendly with policemen from Sinhala and Muslim communities and lose their
morals. In addition, they pass on information on the struggle which is taking place in the north”
(2009, 169–70).
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“Lesbian,” “whore,” or “slut,” Fahima was, above all, blamed for having
a perverted sexual orientation: She prefers to have sex with “Arabs.” It was as
if the strength of the sexual prohibition was recruited to reinforce the
rationale of apartheid, to charge its transgression with the potency only
sexual taboos can convey. The assumed link drawn between women’s
sexual behavior and the integrity of national borders has been widely
researched. At a certain level, Fahima’s case is yet another example of
this familiar phenomenon. What is interesting here, however, is that the
appeal to sexuality became almost the precondition for uttering any
claim within this story, including, eventually, in the versions told by
Fahima herself. She accused her interrogators of sexual harassment,
trying to question their credibility using the same language they used in
discrediting her. Later, she called Zubeidi “the whore of the Shin Bet”
(Israel’s Security Services) after he had reached an agreement with the
Israeli General Security Services and surrendered his weapons (“Tali
Fahima” 2008).
Nevertheless, perhaps knowing that sexual taboos are more forceful
when superimposed on national and racial borderlines, Fahima tried to
counter the accusations of national/sexual transgression using a different
technique. She tried to distill from her action a pure political message
and to cleanse from it everything that is personal. Not only did she
refuse to talk about her personal life in interviews, but she also
constantly declared that she had none. When the alleged affair was
mentioned, she often replied along the lines of this response:
You should understand, in Jenin there is neither time nor space for fun, for
going out; there is neither space nor time for life. When you are in Jenin you
don’t think of love. Jenin wallows in poverty, in survival, in war, in struggle.
When you are there you cannot but think of death. . . . In Jenin love is a
luxury. Who has the time for love? (Levi 2007)
Jenin appears here as a site with no life, let alone “personal life,” with their
connotations of leisure or love. It is a city of death. Fahima literally became
her political cause and her body became the materialization of that cause:
either as a buffer between Israeli bombs and Zubeidi or as an incarnation of
what may be called “peace” — the coexistence of Israel and Palestine
(represented here by herself and Zubeidi).
In the following section, I propose a different way of reading Fahima’s
action: one that does not lend itself to such a separation of the personal
and the political. Perhaps Fahima’s choice to account for her actions as
if she were a purely political subject attests to her inability to see that her
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own action refuses the language by which these distinctions are made. But
perhaps she had strategic reasons to hold to these distinctions. Perhaps she
realized that if she appears as a woman, as a sexual, desiring being, then she
risks a certain political credibility. Sjoberg and Gentry (2006) describe
precisely such a dynamic: ascribing sexual motives to women’s political
actions serves to “personalize” these actions and depoliticize them.12
This depoliticization, as Hasso (2005) shows, effaces the message of the
activists themselves (in her case, suicide bombers/martyrs), thereby
rendering it susceptible to others’ interpretations. Indeed, once it
became all about love — or perhaps all about sex — Fahima’s action
was not merely distorted to the degree that its political meaning was
almost completely drained out; her message was also turned against
itself. In one of her investigations, her interrogator brought her a gift. “I
thought this is chocolate and unwrapped it,” she recalled. But it was a
pregnancy test: “He asked whether I intend to call my child Muhammad
and whether he will be a little terrorist. ‘Why a little terrorist?’” Fahima
eventually caved in to this excessive and invasive overinterpretation of the
motivations of her act, asserting, “He will be a big one” (Levi 2007).
We could probably spend an entire paper analyzing this claim. We could,
for example, point to a paradox embedded in it: At the very moment in which
this claim defeats the regime of separation, it also accepts its fundamental
assumptions: the identification of all Palestinians with terrorists and of the
very “mixing” of Palestinians and Jews as a threat. The pregnancy, which
may be seen as the ultimate moment of coexistence, also becomes the
moment of destruction and violence. Or we could take it to show that love
must be integrated into our explanations for national struggles, including
the violence they often employ. The fictive maternal love of Fahima to her
fictive fetus brings to the surface real loves of people to their land and to
their children who live under occupation or are killed because of it.13 But
For now, I want to take from this claim only one point. Living in Jenin,
with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, with Zubeidi, Tali Fahima tried to
12. Accordingly, it is not uncommon that women who identify with suffering alongside “wrong”
national lines are called “traitors, sluts, lesbians, and whores” (Cornell 2004, 322).
13. As Stoler’s work clearly shows, love and desire are integral to colonial structures, including colonial
violence. Love can thus appear not as a category working to personalize and depoliticize, as suggested
here, as well as by Hasso (2005) or Sjoberg and Gentry (2006). Love, in other words, can be political.
(Haq’s (2008) work on the militarization of motherhood within the LT (Lashkar-i-Taiba) struggle in
Pakistan provides here another fascinating example, that (re)contextualizes this relation of love and
nationalist violence (almost parallel to the story of Fahima) within the context of motherhood.)
Perhaps, moreover, we should resist these distinctions from the outset, following works such as
Povinelli’s (2006) or Butler’s (2000), which undermine, at least to some extent, the very terms from
which this debate is conducted.
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demonstrate that not all Palestinians, not even all Palestinian fighters, aspire to
kill Israelis. But through the alleged sexual relations, her body was taken to
prove that they all aspire to eradicate Israel as a Jewish state. Her fictively
pregnant body came to encapsulate within it a combination of the threats
that the Palestinians pose to Israelis: a demographic threat, the threat of
terror, the unwanted penetration to the borders of Israel, and the related,
all-too-familiar fear of the (presumably excessive) sexuality of the racialized
other.14
THE PARADOXES OF SUCCESSFUL FAILURES: ANOTHER
POSSIBLE READING
I have presented two different cases of women’s left-wing activism and the
ways gender “intersects” with their political action. In both, a position
within a traditional gender stance molds a political action into traditionally
nonpolitical patterns and thereby turns the action against itself. In the case
of CPW, traditional gender positions are adopted as a tool assisting the
activists when they feel it is urgent to be effective. Yet these positions take
over the presence of the activists at the checkpoints. Their effects surpass
the intention that drew their mobilization; they are interpellated by the
army, facilitating a process of co-optation, and become building blocks for
the checkpoints. In Fahima’s case, a different traditional position of
women (that of the lover) is read into the political action by its critics, in
an attempt to delegitimize it. This ascription renders a political action less
effective (rather than facilitating the deleterious effects of such action).
Neither of these cases is one of unequivocally feminism-based activism,
and neither explicitly relies on agreed-upon assumptions regarding the
gendered positions of the activists. To the contrary, in both cases the
activists attempt to sideline the fact that they are women and foreground
a leftist, antioccupation political action. This divide, which may be
limited to the surface of declared rationales and should perhaps be
exposed as fictive, highlights a significant facet in the operation of
gender: Both cases enable us to see the extent to which our gendered
and sexual positions are given to others and remind us that we must
account for the effects of this “giveness” on our political action.
14. The relation between these last two is important. If the coherence of the state is based on a sexual
contract, as Pateman (1988) argues, and if this contract is crucial in understanding current regimes of
violence, as Das (2008) suggests, then we must bear in mind that this contract was always also a racial
contract.
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These two stories are much more ambivalent than what I have allowed,
however. First, they cannot simply be told as stories of “failure.” CPW
succeeded in completely altering the public debate concerning the
checkpoints in Israel and outside of it. It continues to reduce violence,
harassment, and misconduct at the checkpoints on a daily basis. And if a
certain degree of cooptation is what enables one person — and sometimes
200 people — to get home earlier, or enables a sick person to get needed
treatments, then it cannot be a failure here. Furthermore, the story of
CPW cannot be understood merely as a mobilization of conservative
gendered identities to promote or to counter some radical left politics that
either fails or succeeds, or both. Beyond the ambivalence of the failure/
success criterion, it is also not altogether clear what happens to the
categories of gender in this mobilization. Many women’s organizations
have drawn on the maternal positions of their members to radicalize
motherhood (or their members), to politicize it, or better, to reveal that the
political versus private/domestic division can never be maintained
(Guzman Bouvard 2002; Neugebauer 1998; Orleck 1997). Eventually,
organizations that rely on maternal positions as part of their political action
“cannot be viewed as either reinforcing or tearing down gender power
relations. They do both” (Bayard de Volo 2006, 162). We can return here
to Butler’s notion of performativity to state that any duplication of a
traditional gender stance, any repetition through which this stance is
assumed, is always also the means for its destabilization.
While CPW does not explicitly seek to radicalize motherhood or change
gender hierarchies, its members’ maternal presence at the new front line
can be viewed as doing so. More importantly, it is this very presence that
may have the potential of subverting the racial assumptions underlying
the relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinians. If we examine the
maternal practices of CPW activists in relation to national — and
colonial — assumptions in which configurations of motherhood are
often given (de Alwis 2002; Stoler 1995), then we can find in them
traces of a critique, not simply of concrete checkpoints and a regime of
occupation but also of the ideology of separation that has founded both
the Zionist and the Palestinian national projects at least since 1948.
At this point we can return to the cookies. In the story with which I opened,
cookies were brought to the checkpoint as part of a strategic or instinctive
adoption of a maternal stance. But more often, cookies are present at the
checkpoints in their absence: They are the subject of a common accusation
hurled by the soldiers at CPW members: “Why do you neglect to bring us
cookies or soft drinks?” “Why are you such bad mothers?” “Why, ‘in the
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words of the activists’s child from the report I cited earlier,’ are the Palestinians
more important to you than your own children?” A “collapse into
motherhood” — an uninvited summoning of the maternal position into
the activists’ presence at the checkpoint — fails here on its own terms. The
activists appear to be quite bad mothers, and it is this very failure that has
the potential to disrupt something in the social, racial, and national fabric
underlying the occupation. As the main object of their motherly care
resides outside the “Jewish Israeli family,” we may see here the emergence
of the possibility of a new “family” (Mansbach 2007).
Nevertheless, it is important to note in this context that “disruption” must
not be celebrated for its own sake. After all, even for Palestinians, the
women of CPW are quite bad mothers: They abandon them daily and
often can only watch their distress without doing much. More
importantly, the very notions of “help,” “care,” and “maternal concern”
are highly problematic in this context. They reinforce one of the
key racial/national hierarchies at the base of the occupation: the
assumption that the Palestinians are childlike and unable to take care of
themselves.15
Like being a bad mother in the case of CPW activists, “having sex” with
the “wrong” person can be read as an act pushing against accepted social
borders and disrupting social barriers. We have here the same pattern
identified by Cornell in practices of public mourning for “the enemy”:
Something that is often seen as a private sentiment emerges as a political
practice as it disrupts, at one and the same time, both the deployment of
women as representing the nation and the order of “nationalist
aggression” (2004, 321).16 With this disruption and its potential for
reshaping identities and affiliations, maternal care or love/friendship can
become political practices (even if they are not inherently so).
Setter suggested that the case of Fahima can be told as a story of a dual
resistance becoming a single one: a “political” resistance to the Israeli
project of separation and a “personal” resistance to identity categories,
which are merged in the desiring body of Fahima: “Every step she made
in her way to Jenin marks another break in identity, along the course of
a self-transforming desire,” he argues. “She first stopped watching
Israeli news and exposed herself to Arabic media; she then made long
phone calls to her new Palestinian friends; then she talked to a terrorist,
15. On the crucial role of this assumption in justifying the current Israeli occupation, see Kotef and
Amir, 2011.
16. Butler (2004) probably made the clearest case for this political bearing of mourning.
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and then consented to his invitation to his homeland, his town, his house;
then she stayed there, in his house, with his family” (Setter 2007, 3).
Indeed, since 2003, Fahima has radically reshaped her identity. She left
Tel Aviv and moved to the Israeli Palestinian town of Ar’ara (located within
the 1948 borders). She slowly started identifying herself with the
Palestinians: “We are still living under an occupation,” she told a
reporter in an interview from 2008 (“Tali Fahima” 2008). After a couple
of years, she also converted to Islam.17 This change can be understood as
part of a story of a woman who lost her social and economic networks,
was forced out of her job, her apartment, and her circle of friends due to
her political actions, and is desperately trying to find others. Indeed,
most accounts of her story in the Israeli media present a woman who lost
her sanity in the process.
Yet we can take this to be a story about a mode of action that calls into
question almost everything assumed as a given within the Jewish Israeli
identity and that challenges a lot of what goes uncontested in the
internal and foreign politics of Israel. From the moment Fahima became
a political player, her talk about illegality and injustice was so radical that
it was pushed over the edge of what is marked as (liberal) politics: thrust
into the sexual domain and later situated by Fahima herself within the
religious domain. But her action from within these two domains can also
be understood as a break from Israeli society, Israeli politics, and a Jewish
Israeli identity.
Becoming a Palestinian, being the lover of a Palestinian, or simply being
a friend of a Palestinian, Fahima changed the demarcation of the “we,”
which is arguably the most radical political act. In her mode of action,
she also challenged the demarcation of political action, specifically the
possibility of separating the personal and the political. Her body itself —
as a site of movement, desire, dwelling, and ethnic and racist
demarcations — became a site of resistance. Moving back and forth
between Tel Aviv and Jenin challenged the regime of separation
between Palestinians and Israelis. Maintaining a close proximity to “the
enemy,” her body challenged the presupposition that such a proximity
always results in death. As a leftist activist from a low-income family and
of a North African origin, Fahima also entered a political arena usually
17. This may echo the story of another Israeli leftist activist — of a North African decent like herself —
whose primary political action, like hers, was not done on behalf of an organization; who also spent years in
an Israeli prison after being accused of treason; and who, like her, converted to another religion –
Mordechai Vanunu. Working through these lines of similarities is beyond the scope of this article, but
can probably shed some light on the aforementioned processes and their significance.
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inhabited by upper-middle-class Ashkenazis. Finally, when she replaced
Tel Aviv with Ar’ara, Fahima replaced 1967 with 1948; that is, she
replaced the struggle against the occupation, against targeted
assassinations, and military bombing (or checkpoints, for that matter)
with a struggle about the nature of the Israeli/Palestinian society.
CONCLUSION
My analysis brings together two, usually distinct, fields and tries to rethink
both. First, I show that we have to take gender into account when trying to
understand the unintended, uncalculated effects of political actions that
are sometimes imagined to be taking place outside the realm of gender
(in this case, an antioccupation agenda). The critique of humanitarian
interventions and human rights discourse often fails to consider gender
altogether (De Waal 1997; Foley 2009; Ophir 2003). Or it considers the
gender of victims — of the addressees of the political action (as in the
work of Bohmer and Shuman [2008] on refugees). I contend that this
critique should also be attentive to the gendered positions of activists.
Second, my analysis departs from some of the shared assumptions
underlying the feminist debate regarding different deployments of
gender in women’s political activism. The most significant among these
assumptions are 1) viewing the deployment of gender as part of an
intentional ideology, 2) portraying this ideology as either strategic or part
of an essentialist identity claim, and 3) emphasizing the question of
whether this is beneficial or precarious to women (or at least to gender
hierarchies in a given society) (see, e.g., Helms, 2003; Molyneux 1985;
Neugebauer 1998; Samuel 2003). Instead, I wish to set aside the notion
of intention and challenge the assumed dichotomy between strategy and
essentialist presupposition about identity. More importantly, I seek to
understand how particular performances of gender are appropriated by,
interpellated by, and work with the mechanisms of the occupation.
This analysis also offers some reflections on the nature of political action
and, hence, takes part in a dialogue with Arendt. Arendt’s account of the
connections among territorial residence, sovereignty, and rights, as well
as her vision of unbinding the tie between national sovereignty and
human rights within an Arab-Israeli confederation, are undoubtedly
relevant when considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Focusing on
activism, however, I limit my engagement here with Arendt to her theory
BAKING AT THE FRONT LINE, SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY 567
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X11000353
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. SOAS - University of London, on 21 Jun 2019 at 10:03:16, subject to the Cambridge Core
of action. Action, she argues, has its own life. Since, by definition, it
materializes and is carried through in conditions of plurality (in a
political space), it can never be reduced to the actor’s intentions and is
inherently unpredictable. But beyond a manifestation of this claim, the
two cases here show that Arendt’s narrow understanding of political
action — which would have necessarily missed the political facets I
delineated in the previous section — renders her blind to the extent to
which the conditions of plurality also undermine the one trace of an
ontology of individualism with which she cannot dispense: the figure of
the fantasmatic hero.18 This critique does not propose that agency itself
is a fiction, but rather that we have to take into account the manners by
which agency is always given to others as well.
How can one effectively act if the effects of one’s political action can always
be co-opted into the powers they seek to oppose, if one’s political voice can
always be overturned, resignified, and taken to mean the opposite? Perhaps
all we can do to work within this co-optation is examine the local practices
and effects resulting from different appropriations of gender positions,
unfold the various meanings they may contain, lay bare the multiple
manners by which they are read, and hope that we reproduce less of what
we want to put an end to and more of what we want to establish or sustain.
Either way, we can follow Arendt’s call and say that despite the frailty and
risks that political action inherently carries, we should not abandon it.
In the summer of 2010, a small group of CPW activists smuggled several
Palestinian women and their children across the checkpoint and took them
to see the sea, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem. They broke the law and, in an ad
they published in Israeli newspapers, called others to follow them on a
campaign of civil disobedience:
We do not recognize the legality of the “Law of Entry into Israel,” a law
allowing any Israeli and any Jew to travel freely in all parts of the land, but
denying the same right to Palestinians — despite the fact that this is their
country too. This law robs them of the right to visit towns and villages
across the Green Line — places with which they have deeply rooted
18. Feminist scholars have elaborately argued against Arendt’s narrow demarcation of the political
sphere, which excludes from the domain of politics many of the power relations, hierarchies, and
institutions feminists have endeavored to politicize. Benhabib (1993), and Dietz (2002) suggest that
beyond this obvious problem, Arendt is nonetheless valuable to feminist politics/theory. But as
Zerilli suggests, “Notwithstanding a recent shift in feminist attitudes towards Arendt . . . what
stubbornly remains at the end of the day is her apparent refusal to include social issues among the
concerns of politics (2005, 3). Zerilli, as well as Honig (1995), propose a slightly more inclusive
reading of Arendt’s notion of “the social,” yet an interpretative effort is still required to allow
inclusion of such issues in the Arendtian sphere of “the political.”
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family, heritage and national connections. Therefore, we obeyed the voice of
our conscience and took the liberty of bringing these women to a few of
these places. They and we have taken the risk together, with clear minds
and strong conviction. Thus, we Israelis have earned another great
privilege: to experience in our nation, a nation living on its sword, one of
the most beautiful and emotional days of our life; to get to know brave
Palestinian women, full of the joy of life, to spend time with them and to
be free with them — even if only for a single day. (Hammerman et al. 2010)
In the ad, these women situate themselves as followers of Rosa Parks and
Martin Luther King, Jr., but they also follow Fahima. Like her, they
challenge the quintessential logic of the occupation and the logic of
separation.19 In their acts, these women resisted not merely a particular
law (the “Law of Entry into Israel”), but also an entire order deemed
illegal and unjust.
Refusing is a political act in and of itself: refusing to play a game in which
one is bound to lose; refusing to obey an order of radical injustice and the
laws governing it; or, as in Fahima’s case, refusing to be part of a certain
collective. This refusal is not merely the result of personal judgment, as
Arendt argues, or a retreat from the political that is the condition to “go
on living with [oneself]” in a regime whose law has become unlawful
(2003, 44). As Arendt herself suggests, in a political context, obedience is
an act of supporting the government and its rule. A refusal to partake in
the political order is, therefore, an act of interruption, of tearing holes in
the political fabric and revealing the very unlawfulness of the law. It can
be the most effective (or at least the most responsible) political action.
Hagar Kotef is Post Doctoral Fellow at Columbia University, New York, NY:
hk2544@columbia.edu
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